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Saving the Serengeti: Africa’s New International Judicial
Environmentalism
James Thuo Gathii ∗

Abstract
This Article analyzes recent environmental law decisions of Africa’s fledgling
international courts. In 2014, for example, the East African Court of Justice stopped the
government of Tanzania from building a road across Serengeti National Park because of its
potential adverse environmental impacts. Decisions like these have inaugurated a new era of
enhanced environmental judicial protection in Africa. This expansion into environmental law
decision-making by Africa’s international trade courts contrasts with other international courts
that are designed to specialize on one issue area such as human rights or international trade,
but not both. By contrast, Africa’s international courts are simultaneously pushing the
boundaries of judicial enforcement not only of international environmental law, but also of
international human rights.
Three major developments account for the turn to and expansion towards international
judicial environmentalism: First, the decisions of African governments to pursue megadevelopment projects such as the Serengeti superhighway, large extractive industry operations, or
hydro-electric dams without regard to the environment or the interests of local populations.
Second, the channeling of resistance against these mega-development projects through
international courts by alliances of those directly affected by these mega-development projects at
the grassroots level together with global environmental movements. Third, the repurposing of
these international courts to begin enforcing environmental norms included in regional trade and
human rights agreements as a result of the opportunity provided by the filing of environmental
cases.

∗

Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I would like to
thank Emily Hayes and Katie Cierzan for their invaluable research assistance. This paper is based on
ideas developed in my Lecture at my induction as the Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, on 3rd of March 2013.
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The fact that NGOs and individuals have standing to bring cases to Africa’s
international courts and governments remain committed to pursuing mega-development projects
strongly suggests that the trend towards consolidating international judicial environmentalism
may continue. Similar cases filed in domestic courts show the continuity and complementarity
between national and international courts in environmental law cases. Ultimately, this Article
observes that to the extent the cases in Africa’s international courts are filed only against States
leaves a huge accountability gap. Private actors responsible for the same kind of environmental
damage are not amenable to suit in Africa’s fledgling international courts. This accountability
gap for private actors continues an unfortunate legacy that has degraded the environment in
many third world countries, including those in Africa.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
In June 2014, the First Instance Division of the East African Court of
Justice (EACJ) issued a permanent injunction barring the government of
Tanzania from building a road across the Serengeti National Park, a United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world
heritage site. 1 The Appellate Division of the EACJ largely upheld that decision
in July 2015. 2 This decision (hereinafter the Serengeti case or Serengeti) joined a
string of recent decisions issued by Africa’s fledgling international courts that
have inaugurated a new era of judicial environmentalism. Judicial
environmentalism is characterized by expansive interpretations of environmental
provisions in regional economic integration and regional human rights treaties.
My argument is that these new orders to protect the environment inaugurate a
new era of enhanced environmental protection through Africa’s international
courts. They signal the embryonic stages of using courts to enforce international
environmental legal commitments in Africa. This may have lessons for other
parts of the world. This paper, as far as I can tell, is the first one that
systematically discusses how the decisions of Africa’s international courts are
pushing the boundaries of judicial enforcement of international environmental
law in response to three major developments: First, the decisions of African
governments to pursue mega-development projectssuch as the Serengeti
superhighway, large extractive industry operations, or hydro-electric
damswithout regard to the environment or local populations. Second,
resistance through judicial processes against mega-development projects through
alliances of those directly affected by these mega-development projects at the
grassroots level together with global environmental movements. Third, how
Africa’s international courts, spurred by organized groups bringing these cases to
them, have repurposed these trade courts to begin enforcing environmental
norms included in regional trade and human rights agreements.
These new environmental cases simultaneously expose the possibilities and
limits of judicial environmentalism—the possibilities because they have issued
unprecedented decisions protective of the environment when government
conduct violates treaty-protected environmental rights, and the limits because
1

African Network for Animal Welfare (ANAW) v. The Attorney General of the United Republic of
Tanzania, Ref. No. 9 of 2010, Judgment, East African Court of Justice at Arusha First Instance Div.
¶ 64 (Jun. 20, 2014), http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Judgement-Ref.-No.9-of-2010Final.pdf [hereinafter ANAW v. Tanzania].

2

Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania v. African Network for Animal Welfare
(ANAW), Appeal No. 3 of 2014, Judgment, East African Court of Justice at Arusha App. Div. (Jul. 29,
2015), http://eacj.org/?cases=the-attorney-general-of-the-united-republic-of-tanzania-vs-african-net
work-for-animal-welfare [hereinafter Tanzania v. ANAW II].
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the final outcomes of these decisions are at this point unlikely to severely dent
the commitment of African governments to pursue mega-development projects.
What is surprising is that these international courts have not shied away from
announcing extremely broad and significant remedies often carefully hedged
with limitations to protect the courts from political backlash against their
expansive judicial environmentalism.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the establishment of
Africa’s regional trade integration system and discusses the multiplicity of their
objectives, including those relating to environmental protection. I show that
while these integration systems were intended to be primarily about opening up
regional trade, the courts established within them have been re-deployed, first to
become human rights courts and more recently to protect the environment. Part
III discusses the Serengeti case which best exemplifies Africa’s judicial
environmentalism. It begins by discussing how local and international alliances
mobilized to save the Serengeti, a UNESCO world heritage site, through judicial
environmentalism in the EACJ. It discusses how the government of Tanzania
responded to the litigation. Part IV discusses two other important decisions of
Africa’s international courts—Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project
(SERAP) v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 3 from the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice as well as Social and Economic Rights
Action Center (SERAC) v. Nigeria 4 before the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights—to illustrate that there is an emerging judicial environmentalism
movement beyond the Serengeti case in Africa.
Part V discusses some particularly important national judicial decisions
from Kenya and Zambia that have international dimensions in order to show the
continuous nature of the international environmental judicialism of Africa’s
international courts with national courts as well as to complete the picture on
Africa’s new environmental judicialism and its limits.
Part VI discusses judicial environmentalism’s features and theoretical
implications. Here, I discuss how judicial environmentalism represents yet
another redeployment of African international courts following their earlier
redeployment from trade to human rights cases. This part also critically assesses

3

Socio-economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment,
Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African
States (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.worldcourts.com/ecowasccj/eng/decisions/2012.12.14_SERAP
_v_Nigeria.pdf [hereinafter SERAP v. Nigeria].

4

Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) v. Nigeria, 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. (Oct.
27, 2001), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.
pdf [hereinafter SERAC v. Nigeria].
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the prospects of this environmental judicialism for Africa’s fledgling
international courts and for the enforcement of international environmental law.

II. T HE R ISE OF A FRICA ’ S I NTERNATIONAL C OURTS AND
T HEIR R E -R EPURPOSED M ANDATES
Africa has eight functioning international courts. 5 Every African country
except two, Somalia and São Tóme and Príncipe, fall under the jurisdiction of
one of these courts. 6 These courts are historically recent, especially relative to
international courts in other regions. They all became operational in the first
decade of the twenty-first century. 7 Each of these courts was established as a
regional trade court to oversee the implementation of regional trade
commitments. 8 These courts, incorporated in African regional integration
5

These are: the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, see Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights,
Jun. 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III); the East African Court of Justice,
see Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, art. 9(1)(e), Nov. 30, 1999, 2144
U.N.T.S. 255 (providing for the establishment of the EACJ); the Southern Africa Development
Community Tribunal, which is currently suspended but in the process of reconstitution, see Southern
African Development Community, Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules thereof, arts. 15 & 16, Aug. 7,
2000,
http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_
thereof2000.pdf; the Economic Community of West Africa Court of Justice, see Protocol on the
Community Court of Justice, art. 2, A/P.1/7/91, http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/
protocol.pdf; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Court of Justice see Treaty
Establishing the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, art. 7, Dec. 8, 1993, 2314 U.N.T.S.
265; the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires Common Court of
Justice and Arbitration, see Traité portant révision du Traité relatif à l'Harmonisation du Droit des
Affaires en Afrique, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.ohada.com/traite/10/traite-relatif-a-l-harmonisationen-afrique-du-droit-des-affaires.html; the Common Market for Central Africa Court of Justice, see
Traité constitutif, art. 2, Mar. 16, 1994, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org /attachments/
173_CEMAC%20Treaty%20(French).pdf; and the Court of Justice of the West African Economic and
Monetary Union, see Traité de l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine, art. 38, Jan. 10,
1994, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id=fta/agreements/ waemufta.pdf. The Arab
Maghreb Union does not have a functional court yet. See KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS 99 (2014). This proposal also includes the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which, though not formally a court, exercises quasijudicial functions, and its decisions have been heavily relied upon by African sub-regional courts. This
count also excludes the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda which is now undergoing
dissolution and was established under United Nations Security mandate and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone that has received considerable scholarly attention including book-length treatments.

6

ALTER, supra note 5, at 99.

7

Id. at 98 (noting that these courts are “fairly new”).

8

For an extensive analysis, see JAMES GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
REGIMES 264–97 (2011).
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treaties, mimic the European Court of Justice in many respects. 9 Another crucial
design feature these courts have in common is that they allow suits to be
initiated by non-state actors with very liberal access and admissibility rules. 10
Although these courts were established as regional trade courts, three of
them have primarily decided human rights cases—the East African Court of
Justice the Southern African Development Community Tribunal (“SADC
Tribunal”), and the West African Community Court of Justice (“ECOWAS
Court”); the latter is the only one with an explicit jurisdictional mandate to
decide human rights cases. 11 By contrast, the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal
have pursued a broad interpretive strategy to justify assuming jurisdiction over
human rights by invoking human rights provisions contained in the preambles
of treaties establishing regional trade communities. 12 Thus, a major feature of
these courts is the manner in which they have repurposed their original mandate
over trade disputes to become bold adjudicators of human rights cases and
disputes of a political nature. As I have explained elsewhere at length, the
repurposing of their mandates is evidence that these courts are becoming
enmeshed within regional movements that are aimed at advancing human rights
at the national level and that are increasingly spreading at the regional and subregional level. 13
The growth of jurisdiction over human rights in a sub-regional trade court
in Africa is surprising, because national courts are subordinated to powerful
executives. 14 Judicial checks on expansive exercise of executive power are few
and far between in African countries. 15 Hence, the growth of sub-regional
African courts that repeatedly issue rulings that governments do not like is
unusual. It is in part the result of the growth of strong civil society groups deeply
embedded in the regional integration frameworks, particularly in East and West
9

ALTER, supra note 5, at 151 (noting that most African courts emulate the European Court of Justice).

10

For the East African Court of Justice, see James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East
African Court of Justice's Human Rights Strategy, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 277 (2013).

11

Karen J. Alter et al., A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community
Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 776–77 (2013); see also Solomon Eboborah, The Role of the
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice in the Integration of West Africa: Small Strides in the Wrong Direction?
(iCourts, Working Paper, No. 27 (June 2015)), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2621453.

12

James Gathii, Sub-Regional Court or Employment Tribunal? The Legacy and Legitimacy of the Case-Law of the
COMESA Court of Justice 2001-2015, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRIBUNALS
(forthcoming 2015).

13

Gathii, Mission Creep, supra note 10, at 295–96.

14

Paul Brietzke, Private Law in Ethiopia, 18 J. AFR. L. 158 (1974).

15

Kwesi Prempeh, A New Jurisprudence for Africa, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 135 (1999).
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Africa, as well as the slow but sure emergence of a cadre of judges with a
normative commitment to ideals such as the rule of law, human rights, and good
governance. The human rights jurisprudence of these sub-regional courts marks
a clear departure from the judicial subservience to authoritarian governance and
judicial acquiescence to powerful forces that arguably still animates the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Court of Justice. 16 Thus, sub-regional
courts are responsive to the failure of domestic mechanisms to redress human
rights violations and the threats posed to the rule of law in the absence of any
checks at the national level. 17
Judicial environmentalism represents a second repurposing of Africa’s
international courts. They were initially repurposed from trade to human rights
courts and now they are being repurposed to serve the additional function of
adjudicating environmental cases. Decisions such as Serengeti v. Tanzania, SERAP
v. Nigeria, and SERAC v. Nigeria show that environmental interest groups have
learned from human rights lawyers who successfully transformed these courts
from their original mission of adjudicating trade to deciding human rights cases.
Thus, as I demonstrate in this paper, domestic and international environmental
interest groups worked together on a litigation and publicity campaign that has
mimicked that of human rights activists in persuading these courts to decide
environmental cases.
Africa’s international courts are not the traditional international style courts
in which only states can sue states and where jurisdiction is consensual. These
new courts have compulsory jurisdiction to decide whether particular law or
conduct is consistent with the applicable treaty, and they allow private litigants
to initiate litigation. 18 Unlike with traditional international courts that are
dependent on the consent of states prior to adjudication, new style courts in
Africa allow private actors to bring cases against the states without requiring the
state’s consent. 19 Private litigants have been more willing than states to file cases

16

Gathii, Sub-Regional Court or Employment Tribunal?, supra note 12.

17

Alter et al., supra note 11, at 778 (arguing that litigation in sub-regional courts “provides a corrective to
the limited avenues of legal recourse available to victims of rights abuses in Africa”).

18

ALTER, supra note 5, at 5.

19

For example, in the ECOWAS Court of Justice, since 2005, individuals have been able to bring cases
challenging human rights violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
However, individuals do not have a direct right of access to the court to file cases of violation of
ECOWAS trade rules. Only a preliminary reference by a national court or by the ECOWAS
Commission or a Member State can initiate such a case. See Alter et al., supra note 11, at 753–758.
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which have kept these courts busy. This experience accords with that of courts
in other regions of the world where direct private access is permitted. 20
In East Africa, lawyers prevailed in persuading the EACJ to read
preambular provisions referring to human rights of the Treaty for the
Establishment of the East African Community in a manner that conferred the
court jurisdiction to use these provisions to establish a cause of action for
human rights violations. 21 This was a significant victory not only because it
opened the door for a string of human rights cases but also because the EACJ’s
parent treaty explicitly provided it did not have jurisdiction over human rights. 22
This is also a paradigm-upsetting move for a court established to oversee
regional trade integration rather than to oversee compliance with human rights
norms. The EACJ and the SADC Tribunal have turned a classic paradigm of
international trade courts upside down. 23 International trade courts like the
European Court of Justice and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body do not
decide cases brought by citizens alleging violations of civil and political liberties
such as arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, torture, and rendition of
terrorist suspects. 24 These types of cases are entertained in courts established
with a supervisory mandate to oversee the implementation of a human rights
treaty, such as the European Court of Human Rights’ mandate over rights under
the European Convention of Human Rights. 25
By contrast, international trade courts, such as the Panels and the Appellate
Body of the WTO, can only entertain cases relating to trade, not those raising
20

One of the most successful of these courts is the European Court of Justice, which in 2014 received
56,300 cases and 65,800 cases in 2013. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Annual Report of the
European Court of Human Rights 170 (Mar. 2015), http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_
2014_ENG.pdf.

21

GATHII, supra note 8, at 279.

22

See Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, art. 27(2), supra note 5 (providing
that at a future date, the Council of Ministers may extend the jurisdiction of the Court to include
human rights. To date no such extension has been granted.).

23

GATHII, supra note 8, at 288–90.

24

See the Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, art. 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 (providing that “[t]he rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes
brought to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of agreements listed in Appendix 1 to
this Understanding”) [hereinafter DSU]. Appendix 2 includes only Agreements negotiated by WTO
Members and does not include non-WTO treaties such as those relating to international human rights.
Further, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the WTO’s dispute settlement system is intended to
preserve the rights and obligations of members under the covered agreements.

25

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
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questions such as whether or not there are violations of regional human rights,
international human rights or other non-WTO treaties. 26 Although the
European Court of Justice often weaves references to the European Convention
on Human Rights into its decisions, its jurisdiction in contentious cases was
originally designed to oversee economic integration commitments. 27 As such, its
jurisdiction was, in its early years, understood to only extend to human rights
insofar as these rights related to the market freedoms (such as the right of
movement and the right of establishment), rather than the rights established
under the European Convention on Human Rights. 28 Even then, what is truly
remarkable about the majority of cases that have come before the EACJ, the
Economic Community of West Africa Court of Justice (“ECCJ”), and the
SADC Tribunal is that they have not in any way been framed as constituting
violations of any of the market freedoms of their regional treaties. 29 Instead, they
have been primarily based on enforcing human rights provisions in sub-regional,
regional, and international law. 30
These cases have defied the traditional paradigm of international trade
courts of deciding trade cases and leaving human rights cases to human rights
courts. In international law, this paradigm-upsetting move of African
International Trade Courts accepting human rights cases reflects a breakdown of
a pervasive distinction between courts that have exclusive economic mandates,
on the one hand, and courts that have exclusive mandates over human rights
issues on the other. The framers of the post-World War II era consciously
distinguished international institutions falling on the economic side (such as the

26

Joel P. Trachtman, The Jurisdiction of the WTO is Limited to Trade, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 141
(arguing that “only WTO law, not general international law, constitutes substantive law capable of
application in WTO dispute settlement”).

27

Aljandro Saiz Arnaiz & Dra. Aida Torres Perez, Main Trends in the Recent Case Law of the European Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in the Field of Fundamental Rights, European Parliament
(2012) (finding 57 cross references in the human rights case law of the two courts between 2010 and
2011).

28

For more on the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights, see ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 367 (2006)
(noting in part that since the European Union is not itself a party to the Council of Europe, it is not
bound by the European Convention on Human Rights).

29

For more, see James Gathii, The Variation in the Use of Sub-Regional Integration Courts between Business and
Human Rights Actors: The Case of the East African Court of Justice, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2016).

30

Laurence R. Helfer, Sub-Regional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to Freedom of Movement, (iCourts
Working Paper, No. 32, 1-25 (2015)), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2653124.
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World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the then General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade), from those falling on the political side (primarily the U.N.). 31
This design distinguishing political from economic institutions was selected
because of the belief that it was necessary to insulate economic institutions from
the interference of political matters. 32 Hence, the World Bank and IMF were
thought of as institutions charged with non-political, technical mandates over
economic matters. 33 By contrast, political affairs such as those relating to peace
and security as well as human rights were left to the United Nations. 34 This
distinction, with the resulting separation of international courts between those
dealing with trade and those dealing with human rights, is reflected in Europe,
the Americas, and even in Africa. 35
The fact that African international courts share a unique resemblance in
combining simultaneous decision-making authority over trade and human rights
cases calls for an explanation. Why have African international trade courts
decided to effectively turn away from the paradigm of courts exclusively
exercising a trade mandate, on the one hand, and courts exclusively exercising a
human rights mandate on the other? In other words, why have African courts
become hybrid courts? Africa’s international courts could very well have justified
resisting expansive interpretations on the basis of lack of explicit jurisdiction or
by invoking technicalities such as admissibility—as African national judiciaries
often do when they do not want to anger governments. 36 Why did they fail to
travel the well-trodden path followed by national judiciaries?
Ruti Teitel offers a very plausible suggestion. She asks a question pertinent
to this discussion and then answers it:

31

See James Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social
Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107, 159 n.104 (1999).

32

Id. at 159.

33

Id. at 154.

34

Id.

35

In Europe, the European Court of Justice primarily entertains cases arising under European Union law,
whereas the European Court of Human Rights entertains cases arising from the European Convention
on Human Rights. In the Americas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights entertains cases under
the American Convention on Human Rights, whereas trade disputes are the purview of the various
regional dispute settlement mechanisms set up under regional trade agreements such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In Africa, the African Court of Human and Peoples’
Rights has jurisdiction over cases arising from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights but
no jurisdiction over any trade disputes. Trade disputes are the purview of the respective sub-regional
trade courts which are the subject of this paper.

36

Rachel Ellet, Emerging Judicial Power in Transitional Democracies: Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda 347-48 (1998)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University) (discussing the timidity of the Tanzanian judiciary).
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How does judicial discourse shift power by empowering non-state actors,
who in turn, by addressing themselves in various ways to international
courts and tribunals and being addressed by them, become agents of
legitimacy? International courts and tribunals are well situated to supply a
rights-based discourse at least partly detached or autonomous from national
political cultures and constitutionalisms—universalizable, secular,
transnational – and with the authority of high human values. 37

In other words, these courts offer a set of rules that are not dependent on
national legal orders to be invoked and relied upon by private actors. If Africa’s
international courts depended on national legal orders for cases to be brought, it
is likely they would have few to no cases. 38
Notably, not all of Africa’s international courts have repurposed their
mandates to include deciding human rights or environmental cases as those in
East, West and Southern Africa have. For example, the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) Court of Justice has largely remained
an industrial tribunal. 39 Its case law has primarily arisen from employees of the
regional integration organization within which the court is nestled. 40 This court
has not, unlike the other African sub-regional courts, decided human rights
cases. A large part of the explanation for its unique trajectory in redeploying to
37

Teitel further argues quite persuasively that:
[i]n a world that is interdependent but not integrated there quite simply may be
a need for a potentially universalizable discourse that can still function in a
context of difference between persons and peoples, one that comprehends
wrongdoing and atrocities, and can be diffused through multiple institutions
that would otherwise be isolated or fragmented – a discourse that allows
recognition of individual rights and attribution of individual responsibility and
accountability with or without the state, hence arguably allowing for some
change. International adjudicators are better situated that many other
international institutions to supply this discourse and the discourse is arguably
a source of self-legitimization for international courts and tribunals.
Ruti Teitel, LJIL Symposium: A Consideration of “On the Functions of International Courts: an Appraisal in Light
of Their Burgeoning Public Authority," OPINIO JURIS, (Apr. 9, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/
09/ljil-symposium-a-consideration-of-on-the-functions-of-international-courts-an-appraisal-in-light-oftheir-burgeoning-public-authority/.

38

For example, in West Africa, cases alleging a violation of ECOWAS trade rules must be referred to the
ECCJ by national courts. So far, no such cases have been referred to the ECCJ. See Alter et al., supra
note 11 at 774–75 (discussing the choice in giving human rights cases direct access to the ECCJ and
only indirect access for economic cases because of the requirement of a national reference is a political
choice member states made in ECOWAS that has resulted in fewer cases to the Court). In East Africa,
there is only one instance of a referral of cases from national courts to the EACJ. Samuel Mukira
Muhochi v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Ref. No. 5 of 2011, East African Court
of Justice at Arusha (May 17, 2013) (seeking a preliminary ruling on the interpretation and application
of Articles 6(d), 7(2) and 124 of the EAC Treaty, which were at issue in the High Court of Kenya).

39

Gathii, Sub-Regional Court or Employment Tribunal?, supra note 12.

40

Id.
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become an industrial as opposed to a trade integration court has to do with the
lack of civil society interlocutors to bring cases to the court, to defend the court,
and to lobby for court reform. 41 This, together with its restrictive interpretive
mandate and location—first in Lusaka, Zambia and currently in Khartoum,
Sudan—accounts for the court’s inability to build a broader jurisdictional
reach. 42 In addition, even though it shares similarities in its individual access and
jurisdictional rules to other sub-regional courts, it is also limited by an
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule, which together with its restrictive
interpretive strategy has effectively left it to become an industrial tribunal. 43

III. T HE S ERENGETI C ASE AND H OW IT I LLUSTRATES
E NVIRONMENTAL R EPURPOSING OF A FRICA ’ S
I NTERNATIONAL C OURTS
In June 2014, the first Instance Division of the EACJ delivered an
audacious and unprecedented decision. Audacious because as a regional court it
was exercising authority to essentially reverse the decision of a sovereign
government to build a road within its own borders, and unprecedented because
it is the first decision, as far as I can tell, in which an international court invoked
international environmental rules to prohibit a government from undertaking a
project because to do so would be inconsistent with those rules. To fully
appreciate the significance of that decision, this part of the essay will begin by
discussing how Tanzania transformed from a socialist country that valued its
environment and eschewed big development projects to a market-oriented
economy in which big-development projects that have or are likely to have large
adverse impacts on the environment are now the norm. It is this turn from a
commitment to environmental conservation towards neo-liberal market reforms
that brought together local communities opposed to the road across the
Serengeti National Park with international environmental groups. One of their
strategies became using the EACJ in their opposition to the road project.
Thereafter the essay discusses the various phases of the Serengeti case in the
EACJ.

41
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A. Tanzania: From Environmental Conservationism to Big
Development Projects
The Serengeti National Park, located in Tanzania, is a one and one-half
million-hectare park designated by UNESCO as a world heritage site because of
its pristine natural habitats, wildlife populations, rich biodiversity, and status as a
critical ecosystem in East Africa. 44 The populations that live in the Serengeti
National Park are mostly indigenous people who depend on the Serengeti for
their livelihood and who have lived sustainably in the park for thousands of
years. Tanzania became independent from British colonial rule in 1962 as a
socialist country dedicated to preserving and protecting its environment.
In the 1990’s, Tanzania’s commitment to environmental conservation and
preservation ended as its political leadership abandoned the socialist
commitment to central planning and environmental conservation and adopted a
market-centered, neo-liberal development agenda. 45 In addition, once the
government adopted a multi-party system of government in the 1990’s, it began
seeing the indigenous populations of the Serengeti as a potential voting block. 46
Thus, in 2005, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete promised the inhabitants of
the Mara Region, the area west of the Serengeti National Park, that the
government would build a road connecting them with eastern Tanzania’s
markets, hospitals, and other services during his presidential election campaign. 47
From Kikwete’s perspective, building a road across the Serengeti was consistent
with Tanzania’s new commitment to stimulating economic growth through large
infrastructural projects, and in the process getting political support for the ruling
party from the region’s 2.3 million residents. 48 Unlike neighboring Kenya, whose
nationalist ruling party was ousted from power more than a decade ago,
Tanzania’s nationalist party—initially the Tanganyika African National Union
(TANU), and since 1977; the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)—still wields the

44

UNESCO designates a place a world heritage site because of its cultural or natural significance as
defined under the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural
Heritage. UNESCO, Serengeti National Park, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR., http://whc.unesco.org
/en/list/156.

45

Michael Chege, Swapping Development Strategies: Kenya and Tanzania After Their Founding Presidents, in
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW REALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 247, 250 (David E. Apter
& Carl G. Rosberg eds., 1994).

46

UNESCO, supra note 44.

47

Jeffrey Gettlemen, Serengeti Road Plan Offers Prospects and Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/10/31/world/africa/31serengeti.html.
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ANAW v. Tanzania, supra note 1, ¶ 22. Among the ideas the government invoked in building the road
was the argument that it would lower transportation costs between Mugumu and Loniondo Centers. Id.
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reins of government although it has a much weaker opposition political
movement than Kenya. 49
Building the road across the Serengeti therefore symbolizes the stakes
between two discordant Tanzanian identities: one as the nation of African
socialism, idealized by “its founding father” and first President, Julius Nyerere,
as free from corrupting foreign investment and centered on agricultural
production; 50 and the other as the nation of Western-friendly capitalism and free
markets envisioned by President Kikwete, partially reliant on foreign investment
for industrial expansion and economic growth. 51
As a socialist, one of the principal aims and objectives of Nyerere’s
platform was to ensure that the government exercised “effective control over
the principal means of production and [pursued] policies which facilitate the way
to collective ownership of [Tanzania’s] resources.” 52 Nyerere posited that
increased agricultural production and pastoral farming would ignite Tanzania’s
development. 53 He warned against investment in a large foreign owned industrial
sector, 54 because such development would have to rely on foreign aid and
corporate investment that would result in the cession of its freedom to such
investors. 55 In addition, Nyerere was committed to conservation and wildlife
preservation as he set out in his important Arusha Manifesto in 1961. 56 In this
Manifesto he solemnly declared on behalf of his nation to preserve the “rich and
precious inheritance” of Tanzania’s wildlife and habitat for future generations. 57
He believed Tanzania’s success or failure of this task “would not only [affect]
the continent of Africa but the rest of the world as well.” 58
49

On Tanzania’s opposition, see generally Barak Hoffman & Lindsay Robinson, Tanzania’s Missing
Opposition, 20 J. OF DEMOCRACY 123 (2009) (discussing how CCM suppresses any opposition to its
near-monopoly of power).

50

Tanzania: Kikwete Support Will Spur Serengeti Road, OXFORD ANALYTICA DAILY BRIEF (Oct. 1, 2010),
https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB163089/TANZANIA-Kikwete-support-will-spur-SerengetiRoad.

51

For an account of President Kikwete’s development plans, see The Tanzania Five Year Development Plan
2011/2012-2015/2016: Unleashing Tanzania’s Growth Potentials, THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
PRESIDENT’S OFFICE, PLANNING COMMISSION, (June 2011), http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/fileadmin/
_migrated/content_uploads/FYDP-2012-02-02.pdf.

52

Julius K. Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration, in UJAMAA – ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM 13, 15 (1968).

53

Id. at 29.
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Julius K. Nyerere, The Purpose is Man, in UJAMAA – ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM 91, 96 (1968).
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Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration, supra note 52, at 25–26.
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Conservation Critical to Tanzania’s Future, MELLOWSWAN FOUNDATION AFRICA-TANZANIA (Aug. 17,
2010), http://mellowswanafrica.org/arusha-manifesto/.
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Yet, however well intended Nyerere’s commitment was to development
through socialism, Tanzania’s economy stagnated with only 0.2% growth in real
per capita GDP between 1976 and 1984. 59 The nationalization of Tanzania’s
major commodities led to a sharp decline in production, and the large
bureaucracy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s capital, led to corruption, patronage,
and high import and export taxes. 60 Finally, in June of 1986, a gathering of
Tanzania’s leading donors in Paris, under the chairmanship of the World Bank,
adopted an economic recovery program for Tanzania with market-production
priorities. 61 However, while the program may have caused positive GDP growth,
it also led to rising income inequality and a collapse of government-provided
services. 62
In contrast to Nyerere’s ideal of a socialist Tanzania, President Kikwete,
who has continued the 1986 market-oriented economic program for Tanzania,
relies on foreign government borrowing and assistance as well as on foreign
investors to develop Tanzania’s infrastructure, exploit its natural resources, and
spur its economy. 63 President Kikwete’s economic vision includes a reliable and
extensive road network to connect the remote regions of Tanzania to its capital,
Dar es Salaam. 64 This road network, including the Serengeti road, will, according
to this vision, lower the cost of business in the country and attract investment. 65
Some of the residents of the Serengeti National Park and its environs support
the road project because the Mara region is not connected with the large urban
markets in eastern Tanzania. 66 For example, Edward Porokwa, the head of the
Pastoralists Indigenous Non-Government Organizations, argued that Kenya
benefits from cheap Tanzanian cattle at the expense of Tanzanian cattle herders
west of the Serengeti who have no access to eastern Tanzania’s urban markets. 67
59

Chege, supra note 45, at 247, 250.

60

Id. at 268-89, 272-73.

61

Id. at 273.
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Id.
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Paul Kibuuka, Tanzania: Gov’t Now Views Private Sector as Engine for Growth, ALLAFRICA.COM (Aug. 7,
2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201408070465.html.

64

Deogratias Mushi, Tanzania: Reflecting on Kikwete’s Five Year Development Plan, ALLAFRICA.COM (Dec. 22,
2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201112230262.html.

65

Tanzania: Kikwete Talks Tough on Roadblocks,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201503232142.html.

66

George Omondi, Kenya, Tanzania Experts Differ on Serengeti Road Plan, BUSINESS DAILY (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-and-Tanzania-experts-differ-on-Serengeti-road-plan//539546/1962852/-/11njmi3z/-/index.html.
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Marc Nkwame, East Africa: NGOs Attack Kenya Over Serengeti Highway, ALLAFRICA.COM (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201204300003.html.
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President Kikwete has also announced plans to transform the port at Dar
es Salaam into a major regional transport center connecting the county and its
landlocked neighboring countries to the rest of the world. 68 In order to fund
these projects and attract investment, the Tanzanian government relied upon
foreign investment 69 and the profits from the privatization of formerly state-run
operations, such as those at the port at Dar es Salaam. 70 The government also
believes the privatization of the port’s services will attract more business to the
port as its efficiency increases. 71
Yet, President Kikwete does not wholly disregard agriculture as a means of
development; he simply believes that industrial farming will result in exportable
outputs. 72 His vision of development, however, is exactly what Nyerere feared
would cause a loss of Tanzanian freedom and the Serengeti road’s possible
threat to spectacular wildebeest migration from Kenya’s Maasai Mara to
Tanzania’s Serengeti National Park—a migration considered to be a modern
“wonder of the world.” 73 In addition, in 2012, President Kikwete attempted to
evict the Maasai, an indigenous group of pastoral herders whose ancestral land
spans the Maasai Mara Game Reserve in southern Kenya into the Serengeti and
surrounding regions in Tanzania, 74 from the Loliondo region. 75 While Nyerere
believed the Tanzanian identity resided with these small-scale pastoral herders
and farmers, President Kikwete has argued that a “nomadic lifestyle is
unproductive,” and would remove the Maasai to make way for efficient
agricultural production. 76
Additionally, Tanzania’s development plans directly challenge those of the
regional economic powerhouse, Kenya. For example, the planned development
68

69

Edmund Blair & Fumbuka Ng’Wanakilala, Tanzania President Maps Out Plans for Transport Hub, REUTERS
(Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/africa-summit-tanzania-transportationre-idUSL6N0N346U20140411.
Id.

70

Alex Ngarambe, Less Delays at Port of Dar as Services are Privatized, THE EAST AFRICAN (Jul. 12, 2013),
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/Business/Less-delays-at-port-of-Dar-as-services-areprivatised-/-/1433224/1912856/-/jfdaoyz/-/index.html.
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The Maasai People, MAASAI ASSOCIATION, http://www.maasai-association.org/maasai.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2015).
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Jason Patinkin, Maasai Fury as Plan to Lure Arabian Gulf Tourists Threatens Their Ancestral Land, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/30/maasai-gamehunting-tanzania.
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of the Dar es Salaam port would compete with the port at Mombasa, “east
Africa’s main gateway,” and Kenya’s plans to construct a new port at Lamu to
transport goods from its own landlocked neighbors to the world. 77 It is very
plausible therefore that another motivation for building the road is to challenge
Kenya’s economic dominance in the region so that Tanzania could become an
alternative to Kenya as the “main gateway” to east Africa. 78 It is notable that
Tanzania was initially excluded from the “Coalition of the Willing,” by Kenya,
Uganda, and Rwanda, a coalition that is more intent on quickly collaborating to
implement regional infrastructural projects to quicken the pace of the East
African Community integration agenda. 79 The Coalition eventually included
Tanzania, but it caused political friction between itself and Tanzania. 80

B. ANAW and the Filing of the Serengeti Case
Founded in 2006, Africa Network for Animal Welfare (ANAW) is a panAfrican non-profit environmental conservation organization based in Nairobi,
Kenya. 81 ANAW is dedicated to promoting the humane treatment of wild, farm,
working, and companion animals and the well-being of communities that live in
proximity to these animals. 82 ANAW proceeds from the assumption that wild
animals are sentient beings and that they have “feelings, emotions and respond
to psychological and physiological changes in the environment.” 83 ANAW’s
work has a grassroots focus. This means that it is engaged in efforts with the
communities who are in most direct contact with animals with a view to
enhancing their mutual welfare. 84 In addition, ANAW aims to build partnerships
and networks with “other animal welfare organizations and governments in
Kenya and across Africa.” 85 ANAW argues its successes include keeping sport
hunting out of wildlife policy and legislation in Kenya; removing and destroying
77

Blair & Ng'Wanakilala, supra note 68.
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2015).
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hundreds of snares and therefore saving thousands of animals from poachers;
and lecturers from universities and welfare representatives from various African
countries about the use of alternatives to lab animals in higher learning. 86 It lists
as successes the filing of the Serengeti case against Tanzania in the EACJ in
addition to hosting Pan-African and international conferences and workshops. 87
Saitabao Ole Kanchory, the attorney ANAW hired to bring the Serengeti
case against the government of Tanzania, had, prior to being instructed to file
the Serengeti case, provided legal advice to ANAW. 88 Ole Kanchory had also
been involved in advocacy and litigation in Kenya for and on behalf of
indigenous communities dispossessed of their land as a result of government
policies and infrastructural projects. 89 He initially wrote a legal opinion for
ANAW about the feasibility of bringing the case against the government of
Tanzania in the EACJ. 90 ANAW was guided by this legal opinion in deciding to
instruct him to file the case. 91 ANAW’s Executive Director has argued his
organization’s mission in bringing the case was designed to “be of future benefit
not only to Tanzanians or East Africans but also the entire humanity [sic].” 92
Serengeti Watch, which I discuss more extensively below, partnered with
ANAW in part by providing funding through its Serengeti Legal Defense Fund
to ANAW for legal fees and research trips. 93 The Friends of the Serengeti also
86
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(Apr.
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Hasselbring, Hunted To Extinction, THE CHRONICAL MAGAZINE (Sept. 29, 2014),
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AFRICA NETWORK FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, (2012) , http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
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provided funds for the Serengeti Legal Defense Fund. 94 ANAW-USA, ANAW’s
American counterpart, had an online campaign to fund the case. 95 Contributors
were asked to donate to the organization through its website. 96
The international alliance that ANAW brought together in the Serengeti
case must be understood as a counterpart to the grassroots organizing around
animal welfare issues in Africa that ANAW had been part of before. In addition,
the lawyer hired by ANAW to file the case, Saitabao Ole Kanchory, had been
involved in filing cases in the Kenyan High Court on environmental
conservation on behalf of Maasai communities affected by development
projects. 97 He had, for example, represented the Maa Community in its challenge
of appointments to the Kenyan National Land Commission, 98 indicating his
prior commitment to issues surrounding Maasai community and their land
rights. ANAW and perhaps the Serengeti Legal Defense Fund, insofar as I can
tell, provided funding for Mr. John Kuloba, the Kenyan environmental impact
assessment specialist 99 who evaluated the impact of the Serengeti road and
concluded the project should be abandoned due to its negative impacts on the
ecosystem, he also testified on behalf of ANAW in the case. 100
ANAW was therefore the glue that brought together mobilized grassroots
indigenous communities, on the one hand, and international environmental and
conservation groups, on the other, in their efforts to defeat the building of the
road.

C. International NGO Opposition to the Serengeti Road
Although President Kikwete promised to build the Serengeti road in his
2005 election campaign, international mobilization against it did not begin until
2010. 101 An article published in 2013 in Departures, a travel magazine, reported
94
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that Dr. Dennis Rentsch of the Frankfurt Zoological Association had uncovered
Tanzania’s plan to pave the road in May of 2010. 102 Dr. Rentsch inferred from
tiny red flags dotting the trees along the current road that a construction project
through the Serengeti would soon begin. 103 He quickly conveyed this
information to his boss, Dr. Markus Bonner, who then attempted to use the
agency’s influence to stop the construction of the road. 104 When this effort
proved unsuccessful, Dr. Christof Schenck, the director of the Frankfurt
Zoological Society, sent a letter dated May 31, 2010 to President Kikwete urging
him to halt the construction. 105 Dr. Schenck also sent a copy of the letter to a
New York Times “Opinionator” writer Olivia Judson. 106 Judson then published an
opinion on June 15, 2010 on her and the international community’s concerns
over the proposed road’s bisection of the annual wildebeest migration route,
now designated as an additional “wonder of the world,” and the greater
accessibility the road would provide to poachers. 107 Additionally, Dr. Bonner,
along with other conservationists and scientists, published an article in Nature on
September 16, 2010 that decried the planned construction of the road. 108 This
enhanced international awareness about the planned road and its potential
environmental impact. 109
Several NGOs became aware of the construction project and began to
organize an international response to it. 110 In May 2010, Boyd Norton learned
from his Maasai friends of the Tanzanian government’s Serengeti highway
construction plan. 111 Within a few days Norton created the “Stop the Serengeti
Highway” Facebook page that quickly drew international attention to the issue
and began to organize opposition to the road. 112 In the fall of 2010, Norton and
Dave Blanton, along with the Earth Island Institute, a U.S. conservation-focused
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NGO based in Berkeley, CA, 113 created a project named “Serengeti Watch.” 114
The Serengeti Watch’s social media campaigns, outreach with other international
NGO’s and governments, and organization of Serengeti tourism companies
created a diverse and extensive opposition movement to the road. 115 For
example, the organization formed the “Friends of the Serengeti” to protect the
Serengeti from environmental degradation through sustainable tourism and
activism. 116 The Friends of the Serengeti believe that building the road across the
Serengeti National Park would decrease the flow of tourists and could lead to
major economic losses in an already poor region. 117 Once the road gained
international attention, the African Wildlife Foundation, as well as the German
government and the World Bank, 118 opposed the plan and supported the road’s
construction further south. 119

D. The Serengeti Case in the East African Court of Justice
ANAW filed the case against Tanzania in 2010 seeking a permanent
injunction against the government of Tanzania’s proposed construction and
maintenance of a 53-kilometer section of the Natta-Mugumu – Tabora B-Kleins
Gate – Loliondo Road (“the Road”) across the Serengeti National Park. 120
According to the Tanzanian government, the primary users of the road would be
tourists and officials of the Tanzania National Park Authority (TNPA). 121 Any
who wished to use the road other than tourists of TNPA would be required to
obtain authorization from the park’s management. 122 ANAW’s suit sought an
113
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injunction against the government of Tanzania’s plans to “upgrade, tarmac,
pave, realign, construct, create, and/or commission a trunk road across the
northern wilderness of the park.” 123
ANAW asked the court for a number of remedies: first, to permanently
prevent the Tanzanian government from “maintaining any road or highway
across any part of the Serengeti National Park.” 124 Second, that the court declare
that the construction of the road would violate Tanzania’s obligations under the
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (“the EAC
Establishment Treaty”). Third, that the court find the government of Tanzania
accountable for violating its obligations under the EAC Establishment Treaty. 125
Notably, the Tanzanian government initially planned to upgrade the entire 239kilometer road to asphalt. 126 However, after local and international opposition
from NGOs and UNESCO 127 and a government-hired consultant firm advised
against paving the road through the Serengeti, 128 the government decided to
upgrade the 53-kilometer section passing through the Serengeti “to gravel status
only.” 129 The Tanzanian government abandoned its plan to construct a paved
road through the Serengeti after it was advised a paved road would likely cause
environmental damage and disrupt the annual wildebeest migration—regarded
by many as a spectacular wildlife event. 130
The Tanzanian government first filed a jurisdictional challenge and argued
that the case was time-barred. 131 On August 26, 2011, Tanzania’s objections
were overruled. 132 The EACJ’s First Instance Division determined that it had
jurisdiction over environmental cases brought by any resident of the East
African Community and that it had the power to issue a permanent injunction
preventing Member States from engaging in any conduct that may “affect the
well-being of a shared resource.” 133 However, in October 2011 Tanzania
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appealed this ruling, stating that the court did not have jurisdiction. 134 As a
result, the case was sent to the appellate court. 135
On March 15, 2012, the EACJ Appellate Division ruled in the ANAW’s
favor by dismissing the government’s appeal. 136 In Tanzania’s reply to the
reference filed in the hearing on the merits in the First Instance Division, it
argued first that the road as it currently existed had been in use without any
negative impact on the park, and second that it was not the first road of its
kind. 137 Tanzania further argued that the case should be dismissed because a
Protocol on the Environment envisaged in the EAC Establishment Treaty had
not yet been enacted. 138 Tanzania also argued that the EACJ did not have
jurisdiction to determine if there were violations of non-EACJ treaties such as
International Conventions and Declarations on Environment and Natural
Resources. 139 The First Instance Division ruled in favor of ANAW and against
Tanzania on June 20, 2014. 140 According to the court, the applicants had
demonstrated that Tanzania intended to upgrade, tarmac, pave, realign, create
and/or commission a trunk road across the northern wilderness of the worldfamous Serengeti. 141 Further, the court held that the provisions relating to the
environment in the EAC Establishment Treaty were in force as they were
properly ratified, notwithstanding the fact that a Protocol on the Environment
had yet to come into force. 142
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On whether the applicants were entitled to permanently bar the
government of Tanzania from building the road, the court held that if the road
project were implemented as originally planned, the effects would be devastating
both for the park and neighboring parks, and therefore it shall not be built. 143
The court was sensitive to the arguments of the government of Tanzania,
observing in part that while the aim of its decision was to prevent future
degradation of an ecosystem, this must be done without taking away the
government’s ability to develop the economy of the region. 144
The government of Tanzania then appealed this decision of the First
Instance Division to the Appellate Division. 145 In the Memorandum of Appeal,
the Tanzanian Attorney General prayed the court to set aside the judgment of
the First Instance Division, allow its appeal with costs, and make any other
orders it deems just and equitable. 146 Tanzania argued the following grounds for
the appeal: first that, the First Instance Court erred in law and fact by issuing a
judgment on the Tanzanian government’s proposal to upgrade the road to
asphalt. 147 Second, that the First Instance Court erred in law and fact in its
enforcement of Articles 111–14 of the EAC Establishment Treaty as it has yet
to be negotiated, agreed, signed, and ratified by all of the Partner States. 148 Third,
that the lower court incorrectly concluded that it had jurisdiction to settle
disputes based on other international declarations and conventions outside of
the EACT. 149 And finally, the First Instance Court wrongfully granted a
permanent injunction against Tanzania as it lacks the power to do so under the
EACT. 150 In the Scheduling Conference on September 8, 2014, the parties
agreed that the Appellant’s four grounds for appeal would comprise the agreed
issues for the court’s consideration along with a fifth issue of whether the parties
143
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were entitled to the remedies sought. 151 Both the Appellant and the Respondent,
ANAW, filed submissions and the court decided the case on July 29, 2015. 152
On the question whether the First Instance Division erred in law by
enforcing Articles 111–114 of the EACT when those Articles have yet to be
negotiated, agreed to, signed, and ratified by all EACT partner states through an
appropriate protocol, Tanzania lost the appeal. 153 These provisions impose on
EACT Member States obligations, duties, and undertakings with regard to their
mutual cooperation on environmental issues. 154 The Appellate Division held that
all provisions of the EACT (Articles 5(3)(c)–114(1)) are “live and vibrant”
provisions of the EACT and, as such, are subject to the Court’s interpretation
and application pursuant to its Article 27(1) power to do so and its Article 23(1)
power to ensure compliance with the EACT. 155 The Appellate Division held that
the failure of EACT partner states to ratify a Protocol on the Environment and
Natural Resources does not void the obligation of the Partner States to be
bound by the EACT and has nothing to do with the Court’s ability to interpret
and apply Articles 111–114. 156
The Appellate Division held that Articles 111–114 of the EAC
Establishment Treaty, which relate to environmental obligations, responsibilities,
and standards of EAC states, are self-executing and do not require a protocol or
other special act, process, procedure or proceeding to establish their
enforcement. 157 In a very important finding the Appellate Division affirmed that
these provisions are not only obligations of the Partner States, but also causes of
action allowing an injured party to seek a remedy against the state for their
breach without having to demonstrate “a personal tort, right, infringement,
injury or damage specific to himself.” 158 The Appellate Division held that the
EAC Establishment Treaty does not require the Partner States to ratify a
Protocol on the Management of the Environment and Natural Resources in
order for Articles 111–114 to become enforceable. 159
ANAW also prevailed on the question of whether the First Instance
Division had erred in law by considering whether Tanzania had violated non151
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EAC international environmental declarations and conventions such as the
African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources of
2003, the Rio Declaration of 1992, the Stockholm Declaration, the U.N.
Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the U.N. Convention of
Biodiversity of 1992, and the U.N. Declaration on the Environment and
Development of 1992. 160 The Appellate Division found that the First Instance
Court’s decision did not rely on these non-EAC international conventions and
declarations regarding environmental protection. 161 The Appellate Division
noted that even if the First Instance Division had considered aspects of these
international instruments, it would not “have been unduly alarmed” because
EAC Member States “do subscribe to the various standards, norms and values
of these Conventions.” 162 The Appellate Division ruled, by analogy to another of
its decisions on human rights, that there is nothing that precludes it from
referring to relevant provisions of non-EAC treaties “in order to interpret the
EAC Treaty.” 163 It further ruled that such references are relevant where the
EACT recognized in the language of the EAC treaties and as such become “ipso
jure obligations” of EAC Member States. 164
On the question of whether the court has jurisdiction to grant permanent
injunctions against sovereign EAC Partner States, the Appellate Division held
that the Court had jurisdiction to issue a permanent injunction against EAC
Partner States. 165 It held that a permanent injunction is an equitable remedy
“encapsulated” within Article 23(1) of the EACT as well as Rule 1(2) of the
court’s Rules of Procedure derived from Article 42 of that treaty. 166 The
Appellate Division concluded that the EACJ’s power to grant a permanent
injunction is an inherent right available to every court of law in order to
adjudicate cases. 167
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The foregoing finding sits in stark contrast to the Appellate Division’s final
finding on the question of whether the First Instance Division properly
considered Tanzania’s reference challenging the Applicant’s “mere proposal” to
construct the Serengeti road. 168 Here, the Appellate Division’s judgment is
murky for several reasons. First, the question whether what ANAW was
challenging was a “mere proposal” or not was not litigated in any earlier parts of
the case. Tanzania raised it for the first time in the appeal against the merits
decision of the First Instance Division. 169 The Appellate Division recognized this
issue was being raised for the first time in the appeal. 170 Notwithstanding the fact
that this issue was being raised for the first time, the Appellate Division
curiously held that the First Instance Division Court had the obligation to
confirm that ANAW’s case centered on a “real live dispute,” and not a mere
proposal to build a road. 171 Relying on cases it had decided earlier on the
question of mootness, 172 the Appellate Division held that the function of the
EACJ courts is to rule on concrete disputes between adverse parties, not to
entertain hypothetical questions. 173 It held that under Article 30 of the EACT,
parties may only “challenge the legality of an ‘act, regulation, directive, decision,
or action’ of a Partner State” that it alleges violates the EACT. 174 Actions of the
Applicant that may have constituted a disputable action include agreed upon
architectural plans and drawings and/or bills of quantities. 175 The Appellate
Division relied on a statement made by the First Instance Division Court to the
effect that “all parties now agree that if the initial plan [were] implemented,” its
negative impacts on the Serengeti would not outweigh the benefit of connecting
the residents of Mugumu-Loliondo to Dar es Salaam. 176 This statement,
according to the Appellate Division, demonstrated that Tanzania had abandoned
its proposal to construct a paved road across the Serengeti. For this reason the
Appellate Division held that such inaction or omission by a Partner State could
not constitute a cause of action under Article 30 of the EACT. This is because
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challenging a proposal as opposed to conduct would not suffice to be a case in
controversy under Article 30. 177
These findings that ANAW’s case challenged a “mere proposal” to build a
road and that it was unactionable sit in sharp contrast to the Appellate Division’s
endorsement of ANAW’s case in other respects. For example, in ordering that
each party to the case bear their own costs, the Appellate Division noted that
ANAW had
partially triumphed in their quest (in this, the first Environmental Case of its
kind to be brought before this Court). They brought the Reference and have
prosecuted it not out of any wish for personal, corporate, or private gain;
but out of the public spirited interest of the noblest kind—namely
conservation, preservation and protection of a natural resource which . . . is
truly a gem of a heritage, one-of-a-kind for all mankind. 178

A second reason for the murkiness of the Appellate Division’s judgment is
that it did not explicitly lift the permanent injunction that was imposed by the
First Instance Division. 179 This lack of clarity seems purposeful—the Appellate
Division may well have realized that expanding the wings of the EACJ to cover
environmental disputes would wither on the vine if the court did not only
affirmatively endorse its jurisdiction to entertain such suits, but at the same time
realized that it had to make the government of Tanzania happy so that the court
suffered no backlash. 180 The judgment was confusing enough that in September
2015 when I interviewed ANAW’s lawyer who had litigated the case, he too was
unsure what the Appellate Division intended by not lifting the permanent
injunction. 181 Clearly, getting an order that could be served on the government
of Tanzania pursuant to the judgment was out of the question because of this
lack of clarity. Yet Tanzania on its part can see the writing on the wall. Should it
decide to make concrete plans to build the road, ANAW can go back to the
court and get orders to permanently bar it from building the road. The final
decision of the Appellate Division is less emphatic than its earlier decision
discussed above, in which it announced that the EAC Establishment Treaty
binds Member States “to observe a variety of express undertakings and
obligations concerning the promotion, preservation, conservation and protection
of the environment” that are “clearly and emphatically” within the court’s
177
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purview. 182 Since that earlier decision, major changes had occurred on the court;
in particular, one of the longest-standing members of the court from its
inception, Harold Nsekela, had retired as Judge and President of the court. 183 He
had been replaced by a younger cadre of judges on the Appellate Division that
may, based on the final Serengeti decision, appear less likely to use the
jurisdiction of the EACJ to directly challenge EAC Member State
prerogatives. 184

IV. J UDICIAL E NVIRONMENTALISM IN A DD ITIONAL A FRICAN
I NTERNATIONAL C OURTS
A. Social-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria 185
Next I discuss, Social-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, decided by the ECOWAS Court of Justice in
December 2012. 186 The plaintiff, SERAP, is a non-governmental organization
registered in Nigeria, and the defendants are the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the
Attorney General of the Federation, and the Chief Law Officer of the
Federation. 187 The original complaint filed by the registered trustees of SERAP
on July 23, 2009 was brought against nine defendants: the President of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Attorney General of the Federation, Nigerian
National Petroleum Company, Shell Petroleum Development Company, ELF
Petroleum Nigeria Ltd., AGIP Nigeria PLC, Chevron Oil Nigeria PLC, Total
Nigeria PLC, and Exxon Mobil. 188 However, all of the defendants apart from the
President and the Attorney General raised preliminary objections to the
ECOWAS Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over them, and the court ultimately
182
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held that it had no jurisdiction over these particular defendants. 189 The court
rejected the defendants’ preliminary objection regarding the plaintiff’s alleged
lack of legal standing and held that the plaintiff was a legal person who had the
“locus standi” to file a claim in the court. 190 SERAP filed an amended petition
against solely the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Attorney
General of the Federation in March of 2011, and these defendants filed a joint
defense in response. 191 In this claim, SERAP alleged that the Niger Delta, the
densely populated land area surrounding the delta of the Niger River at the Gulf
of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean, has suffered extreme environmental
degradation as a result of oil spills in the region. 192 These oil spills have resulted
for a variety of reasons, including human error, vandalism or theft of oil, and
poor maintenance of oil extraction infrastructure, and they have caused
significant harms to the human inhabitants of the Niger Delta region. 193 It was
alleged that “[h]undreds of thousands of people” have been affected by these
spills, especially the “poorest and other most vulnerable sectors of the
population.” 194
In the case, SERAP sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the
residents of the Niger Delta were entitled to “the internationally recognized
human right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate access to
food, to healthcare, to clean water, to a clean and healthy environment . . . and
the right to life and human security and dignity.” 195 SERAP also petitioned the
court to make a declaratory judgment that Nigeria breached its international
human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
(ACHPR) as a result of its “failure and/or complicity and negligence . . . to
effectively and adequately clean up and remediate contaminated land and water”
in the Niger Delta region. 196 Similarly, SERAP alleged that the defendant
breached its obligations under these treaties due to its failure “to establish
adequate monitoring of the human impacts of oil-related pollution” and its
“systematic denial of access to information to residents of the Niger Delta about
189
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how oil exploration and production [would] affect them.” 197 SERAP further
sought six orders directed at the defendants: to ensure that the residents of the
Niger Delta were allowed to fully attain “an adequate standard of living,
including adequate access to food, to healthcare, to clean water, [and] to clean
and healthy environment;” 198 “to hold the oil companies operating in the Niger
Delta responsible for their complicity in the continuing serious human rights
violations” there; 199 “to solicit the views of the people of the area throughout the
process of planning and policy-making on the Niger Delta”; 200 to “establish
adequate regulations for the operations of multinationals in the Niger Delta, and
to effectively clean up and prevent pollution and damage to human rights”; 201
“to carry out a transparent and effective investigation into the activities of oil
companies in the Niger Delta and to bring to justice those suspected to be
involved . . . in the violation of human rights”; 202 and to “individually and/or
collectively pay adequate monetary compensation” of one billion dollars “to the
victims of human rights violations in the Niger Delta.” 203
Although the Federal Republic of Nigeria maintained that the ECOWAS
Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction to examine any alleged violations of
either the ICCPR or the ICESCR and that only the domestic Nigerian courts
could examine these violations, 204 the court held that the Supplementary
Protocol that amended Article 39 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance on January 19, 2005, provided that “the court has jurisdiction to
determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any Member State” 205
and that “the rights set up in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
and other international instruments shall be guaranteed in each of the ECOWAS
Member States.” 206 The court held that together, these provisions demonstrated
that it had jurisdiction over a relatively wide range of claims that alleged
violations of any of the various human rights protected under any international
treaty to which an ECOWAS Member State has signed. 207 The court further
197
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fortified this holding by citing an earlier precedent, that “once the concerned
right for which the protection is sought before the court is enshrined in an
international instrument that is binding on a Member State, the domestic
legislation of that State cannot prevail on the international treaty or covenant,
even if it is its own Constitution.” 208 In an especially broad ruling, the court thus
determined that it had jurisdiction to decide cases in which claimants alleged
violations of rights asserted in the ACHPR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, and
these international instruments preempt the Nigerian Constitution if there is a
conflict over whether a particular human right is protected, such that the
international instrument’s language prevails. 209
SERAP alleged numerous violations indicative of the nature of litigation in
Africa’s fledgling international courts: Articles 1–5, 9, 14–17, and 21–24 of the
ACHPR; Articles 1, 2, 6, 9–11, and 12.1–12.2(b) of the ICESCR; Articles 1, 2, 6,
7, and 26 of the ICCPR; and Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). 210 It alleged five of these violations with much greater
specificity. 211 The plaintiff first argued that Article 11 of the ICESCR, which
establishes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living – including
adequate food” and requires states to ensure the availability and accessibility of
food to their citizens, was violated when the Nigerian government failed to
protect the natural resource that people in the Niger Delta depend upon for
food, as there have been thousands of oil spills and other environmental damage
to fisheries, farmland, and crops without the government providing adequate
clean-up. 212 It also alleged that this right to adequate food was violated when the
government allowed private oil companies to destroy food sources and failed to
prevent these companies from contaminating and polluting the crops and fish in
the Niger Delta area. 213 The plaintiff next argued that Article 6 of the ICESCR,
which obligates states “to recognize the right of everyone to the opportunity to
earn their living by work,” was violated. 214 SERAP alleged that the Nigerian
government was obligated to take “all necessary measures” to prevent violations
of this right, even if those violations were caused by non-state third party actors,
such as private oil companies. 215
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In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the right to health, as defined in
Articles 16 and 24 of the ACHPR and in Article 12.1 of the ICESCR, was
violated as the Nigerian government “failed to promote conditions” that allow
people to lead healthy lives. 216 It claimed that the defendant’s “failure to prevent
widespread pollution as a consequence of” allowing the oil industry to access the
Niger Delta region directly led to “the deterioration of the living situation for
affected communities” within the Niger Delta area. 217 SERAP also alleged that
the Nigerian government compounded the problem not only by failing to
regulate oil producing activities in the region, but also by failing to enforce the
clean up of oil spills after they had occurred. 218
Nigeria responded by denying that oil exploration and production has a
direct relation with poverty in the region and by stating that the plaintiff’s
allegations are merely speculative. 219 It argued that the Nigerian federal
government established the Oil Minerals Producing Area Development
Commission (OMPADC), which later became the Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC) with the exclusive purpose of formulating policies,
implementing projects, and acting as a liaison with the oil companies with
regards to environmental problems that arise from oil exploration. 220 This
commission was also created to advise the Nigerian government on the
prevention and control of oil spillages and environmental pollution in the Niger
Delta area. 221 Nigeria also argued that it was not its responsibility, but the
responsibility of the license holder, to take “all reasonable steps to avoid damage
and to pay compensation” to oil pollution victims, and that these license holders
should be the ones held liable for any damages. 222
In its decision, the court ruled only with respect to Articles 1 and 24 of the
ACHPR, which together outline the obligation of every African nation state to
“take every measure to maintain the quality of the environment . . . such that the
state of the environment may satisfy the human beings who live there, and
enhance their sustainable development.” 223 The court determined that the
Federal Republic of Nigeria was under the international obligation of both
ACHPR articles and that it failed to adopt sufficient measures, as outlined in
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Article 1 of the Charter, to ensure its citizens the enjoyment of the human right
outlined in Article 24, 224 “the right to a general satisfactory environment
favorable to their development.” 225 The court disagreed with Nigeria, which had
argued that the responsibility for oil pollution should be shifted only to those
companies that hold licenses for oil exploration. 226 Instead, the court held that
state actors are in the best position to hold overarching responsibility for
widespread damages of this kind. 227
The court dismissed SERAP’s original petition for the Federal Republic of
Nigeria to pay a one billion dollar punitive fee, as it ruled that it would be
impracticable to grant pecuniary compensation to individual victims for many
reasons. 228 However, the court held that the Nigerian government must take all
necessary measures to achieve the objectives sought by Article 24 of the
ACHPR “to maintain a generally satisfactory environment favorable to
development.” 229 It ordered the government to take measures, “within the
shortest possible time, to ensure the restoration of the Niger Delta,” “to prevent
the occurrence of damage to the environment,” and “to hold the perpetrators of
the environmental damage accountable.” 230

B. SERAC & CESR v. Nigeria
Another case arising from the Niger delta, this time filed before the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights, was filed by another NGO, the
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and
Social Rights against the government of Nigeria more than a decade earlier than
the SERAP suit in the ECOWAS Court of Justice. 231 In its case, SERAC alleged
that “the military government of Nigeria ha[d] been directly involved in oil
production through the State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum
Company (NNPC), the majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell
Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC),” and that therefore the Nigerian
government had “caused environmental degradation and health problems
resulting from the contamination of the environment.” 232 SERAC argued “that
224
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the Nigerian government ha[d] condoned and facilitated these violations by
placing its legal and military powers” in the hands of the oil companies. 233
Further it was alleged that the government did not monitor the oil companies’
operations or compliance with required standard safety measures in their
operations. 234 The petition also alleged that the government ignored the
concerns of the people affected, in particular the Ogoni communities, and
“responded to [their peaceful] protests with massive violence and executions of
Ogoni leaders.” 235 Such violence included attacking, burning, and destroying
Ogoni villages and homes with military-type weapons. 236 Finally, the petition
alleged that the Nigerian government “destroyed and threatened Ogoni food
sources through a variety of means,” including its “irresponsible” oil
development policies and practices that had contaminated the soil and water,
and its raids on Ogoni villages that had destroyed crops and farm animals. 237
The complaint argued that the foregoing conduct constituted violations of
Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21, and 24 of the ACHPR. 238 The ACHPR contains
the parameters of what the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
has jurisdiction over. It took approximately five-and-a-half years before the
Commission heard the complaint after numerous postponements and
deferments. 239 Among Nigeria’s objections was the argument that the petition
was not admissible before the Commission. 240 The Commission rejected these
objections, noting that the Federal Republic of Nigeria has incorporated the
ACHPR into its national domestic law, and all rights contained in this Charter
may be brought as claims in Nigerian national courts. 241 Article 16 of the Charter
outlines the human right to both physical and mental health, and Article 24 of
the Charter outlines the human right to a clean environment. 242 Both of these
rights acknowledge that a clean and safe environment is closely linked to the
quality of life and safety of the individuals living within that environment. 243 The
Commission held that the Nigerian government “facilitated the destruction of
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Ogoniland” within the Niger Delta and in doing so negatively affected the
physical well-being of the Ogoni people. 244 The Commission held that the
Nigerian government had acted in stark contrast against its obligation to protect
the persons under its authority from interference with the total enjoyment of
their rights outlined in the Charter. 245
In particular, the Commission held that the Nigerian government not only
violated Article 24 of the Charter, outlining the human right to a clean
environment, but it also violated Article 16 of the Charter with regard to the
right to the best attainable state of mental and physical health; Article 14 with
regard to the right to property; and Article 18(1) with regard to the right to the
protection of the family. 246 The Commission interpreted these rights to implicitly
provide the right to shelter. 247 The Commission also held that the Nigerian
military government’s facilitation of the destruction of numerous Ogoni villages
and homes constituted a violation of the right to housing. 248 The Nigerian
government was also held to have violated the right to life and the right to
economic, social, and cultural development with its destruction and
contamination of the Ogoni people’s food sources. 249 The Commission argued
that both international law and human rights law must be “responsive to African
circumstances” and that environmental rights were an essential element of
human rights law in Africa. 250
The Commission further required the Nigerian government “to ensure the
protection of the environment, health and livelihood” of the individuals residing
in Ogoniland by stopping all attacks, conducting an investigation into human
rights violations, prosecuting those actors who inflicted the violations, ensuring
adequate compensation to victims of those harms, making sure that appropriate
assessments are made for any future oil development through effective and
independent oversight bodies, and providing information on health and
environmental risks to communities likely to be affected by potentially harmful
operations. 251
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V. J UDICIAL E NVIRONMENTALISM IN T WO A FRICAN
N ATIONAL C OURTS
A. Friends of Lake Turkana Trust v. Honorable Attorney
General of Kenya (sued on behalf of the Government of
the Republic of Kenya) and Kenya Power & Lighting
Company Ltd. 252
This case was brought by the Friends of Lake Turkana Trust, a registered
trust that works to protect and conserve the waters of Lake Turkana in the very
dry and arid northern part of Kenya. 253 It champions the rights and interests of
the communities within the Lake Turkana Basin. It filed a case against the
government of Kenya and the Kenya Power and Lighting Company which
generates and distributes electricity in Kenya. 254 The suit was originally filed in
the Constitution and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya but
was transferred to the Environment and Land Court pursuant to the division
parceling out cases under the Kenyan Constitution. 255 The petition claimed that
an alleged agreement between the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments to
construct a series of dams had serious adverse consequences. It alleged that
those dams would deprive the people who reside in the Lake Turkana area in
Kenya of their rights to livelihood, lifestyle, and cultural heritage and attachment
to Lake Turkana in violation of Articles 26 and 28 of the Kenyan constitution. 256
It also claimed that the Kenyan government violated Articles 62 and 69 of the
Constitution of Kenya when it failed to act as a public trustee of the land and
conduct a full impact assessment on the potential side effects of the
construction and operation of these hydroelectric power-producing dams. 257 In
particular, the plaintiff was concerned about the Gilgel Gibe III Dam, a high
roller-compacted concrete dam with an associated hydroelectric power plant. 258
Finally, the petition alleged that the arrangements between the Kenyan and
252
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Ethiopian governments would jeopardize the environment and threaten the
cultural heritage of the communities surrounding Lake Turkana. 259
The plaintiff sought an order of mandamus that would compel both the
Kenyan government and the Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited to
make “full and complete disclosures of each and every agreement or
arrangement entered into or made” with the Ethiopian government relating to
the proposed purchase of 500 megawatts from the Gibe III dam. 260 It also
requested an order prohibiting both defendants from entering into further
agreements with Ethiopia relating to the purchase of 500 megawatts until a “full
and thorough independent environmental impact assessment on the potential
effects of Gibe III project on Lake Turkana and the affected communities has
been undertaken.” 261
In reply the government of Kenya, Kenya Power and Lighting Company
and the interested party argued the proposed project was part of the National
Transmission Grid, which aligns with Kenya’s Vision 2030’s National Electricity
Supply Master Plan. 262 Under this plan, Kenya plans to connect power substations with those in the rest of the East African Region and beyond, and the
Ethiopian-Kenyan electricity interconnection is the flag ship project for this
plan. 263 The interested party argued that the project’s socio-economic effects are
vast and include income from short-term employment and a nation-wide,
sustainable, reliable supply of electricity. 264 Further they argued Kenya would be
able to rely on an electricity supply that comes from a cleaner source, as opposed
to the typical and environmental-harming burning of fossil fuels to produce
energy. 265 Thus in these arguments we see the same type of justification the
government of Tanzania used to justify constructing a road through the
Serengeti—an emphasis on economic benefits of a large infrastructural
investment without a concurrent concern for the environmental impact of the
project. From this perspective, the government argued that the project was more
beneficial than detrimental to Kenyans. The government further argued that
there was no contract between Ethiopia and Kenya to purchase 500 megawatts
of electricity from the proposed Gibe III Dam Project. 266 As such, just as
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Tanzania argued in the Serengeti appeal to the Appellate Division against the First
Instance Division’s merits decision, the fact that there was no agreement meant
that the plaintiff’s claim is premature and unactionable. 267 The government
argued it did not have control to determine whether the Gibe III construction
project would take place, and that a Kenyan court was an inappropriate forum in
which to entertain a case based on a proposed construction project that occurs
on a transnational level. 268
In its judgment, the court found it had jurisdiction over the claim and the
parties involved in the lawsuit and that there was not a more appropriate legal
forum or instrument for hearing the alleged claim. 269 The court noted there was
no foreign state or intergovernmental entity brought into the lawsuit as a party
that would make the court unable to hear the case. 270 The court determined that
it was established under section 13(3) of Kenya’s Environment and Land Act of
2012 and conferred with jurisdiction to “hear and determine applications for
redress of a denial, violation … or threat to, rights or fundamental freedom
relating to a clean and healthy environment.” 271
The court then looked to whether the fundamental rights of the plaintiff
had actually been violated and whether the respondents had obligations with
regard to remedying these violations. The plaintiff first alleged that there was a
violation of the right to life and dignity, as enumerated in Articles 26 and 28 of
the Kenyan Constitution, because the purchase of electricity from Ethiopia
would allegedly deprive the affected communities of their livelihood, lifestyle,
and cultural heritage. 272 The plaintiffs provided extensive information and
studies in order to demonstrate the alleged likely negative effects that the
Gibe III Dam construction project would have on the Lake Turkana
communities. 273 In particular, the court looked at two documents: a commentary
written by the Africa Resources Working Group and a report by International
Rivers. 274 These reports indicated that the water resource scheme project
planned along the Ethiopian Omo River would significantly reduce the
downstream of the river and thus drastically reduce the level of Lake Turkana, as
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the river contributes approximately 80% of the waters of Lake Turkana. 275 The
Omo River Delta area is located in northern Kenya, and this land is used
intensively by agropastoralists who live in the delta and along the north and
northeast of Lake Turkana. 276 According to the studies, a reduction in the level
of the lake would possibly destroy these agropastoral systems, along with the
abundant livestock herding and fishing done in this area. 277 This would in turn
cause more pressure on the fewer remaining resources in Kenya-Ethiopian
border region, as the approximately 300,000 current Lake Turkana community
members would have to find an alternative way to make a living. 278 One of the
studies argued that the lake’s fragile ecosystem has already started shrinking,
making it significantly more vulnerable to global climate change, and that a
drastic reduction in the size of the lake could destroy it. 279 The Gibe III Dam
specifically would reduce the available Omo River water for Lake Turkana both
during the two-year process in which the Gibe III Dam’s reservoir would be
filled using the water and also by the dam’s diversion of the water for large-scale
irrigation in the Omo Valley. 280 The studies alleged that this drastic impact on
Lake Turkana has barely been considered in the project’s environmental impact
assessment and that project preparation thus far has ignored the customary
Kenyan downstream water rights in the shared river basin. 281 Even after
consideration of these studies, however, the court agreed with the respondents
that there was not enough to find that any rights had actually been violated. It
stated that there was insufficient reports or evidence as to the actual effect of the
Gibe III hydroelectric project, and at the current stage, the court could not make
a finding that the plaintiff’s right to dignity, life, livelihood, and cultural and
environmental heritage had been violated. 282
The plaintiff next made the allegation that its right to information,
pursuant to Articles 10, 35, and 69 of the Kenyan Constitution, had been
violated as the Kenyan government had refused to disclose the nature and
details of the alleged agreement between the Ethiopian and Kenyan
governments. 283 Article 10 of the constitution enumerates that the Kenyan
275
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government, including the state and all of its public officers, must act with a high
standard of integrity, transparency, and accountability. 284 Article 35 of the
Constitution provides that every citizen has the right of access to information
held by the state or held by another person and required for the exercise of the
protection of any right or fundamental freedom. 285 In a previous case, the Court
had also ruled that this article imposes a positive duty on the state to actively
provide information in the public interest, regardless of whether it has been
specifically requested. 286 On this issue, the court ruled that the respondents and
had a duty to provide the petitioners with all information relevant to the
purchase and transmission of electric power from Ethiopia, but that the
petitioner was not entitled to information relating to the terms of any agreement
entered into between the two governments concerning to the purchase of
electricity. 287
The court held that even if power purchase agreements might not have yet
been entered into, and there was no concrete evidence of harm already suffered,
the respondents and interested party had a duty to establish that no
environmental harm would arise from the said agreements and projects. 288 It
further held that as trustees of the environment and natural resources, the
government and the power companies owed a duty to the Lake Turkana
communities to ensure that the lake’s resources are sustainably managed,
utilized, and conserved, and to exercise the necessary precautions in preventing
environmental harm that may arise from the agreements and projects entered
into with the Ethiopian government that may have any effects of this kind. 289
However, the court declined to grant an order prohibiting the Kenyan
government from entering into any agreement with the Ethiopian government
to purchase electricity without first completing a full and thorough independent
environmental assessment of the project. 290 The court determined that granting
this order was outside of the court’s authority. 291 It held that any environmental
impact assessment will have to be determined in a relevant regional or
international forum after an official agreement has been entered into, and the
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court itself was unable to order the government or the interested party to
complete these assessments in a particular way. 292
This case deals more directly with the hypothetical nature of claims when
litigants seek judicial orders to prevent projects that are yet to be undertaken.
Yet at the same time, the court, unlike in the Serengeti case, did not argue that the
lack of absolute certainty about the nature of these potential harms did not
prevent the court from using the lens of the precautionary principle in
international environmental law under which it was foreseeable that petitioners
reasonably believed that the project would adversely impact thousands of people
in the vicinity of Lake Turkana in northern Kenya to make a livelihood, and
would undermine their cultural heritage and attachment to Lake Turkana. 293
Although the court did not stop the construction of a cascade of dams along the
river that feeds Lake Turkana, thus endangering the delicate eco-system of the
region as well as the right to a clean and healthy environment, it nevertheless
found that the petitioners right to information was violated. 294
The case also demonstrates how judicial environmentalism is seeping into
national judiciaries. It shows how mega-development projects that have an
international dimension can be amenable to jurisdiction in a domestic court.
Finally it indicates the authority a domestic court can wield to order a
government and state owned corporations to make a full and complete
disclosure to the potential victims regarding any arrangement that might
adversely affect their rights, including the right to a clean and healthy
environment.

B. Appellants v. Zambian Government and Mwembeshi
Resources Ltd., High Court of Lusaka, Zambia 295
Another decision demonstrating how judicial environmentalism is seeping
into national judicial systems comes from Southern Africa. The High Court of
Zambia sitting in Lusaka heard an appeal made by an aggregate of Zambian
conservation groups against a decision of the Zambian Minister of Lands,
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection in January of 2014 to allow
the Zambian corporation, Mwembeshi Resources Ltd., to continue its plans to
develop its Kangaluwi Copper Project, which lies within the Lower Zambezi
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National Park in Zambia. 296 Mwembeshi Resources Ltd. is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Zambezi Resources Ltd., a large Australian natural copper
exploration and development company. 297 Zambezi Resource Ltd. was issued a
twenty-five year mining license by the Zambian government in March of 2011 to
operate an open-faced copper mine—the Kangaluwi Copper Project. 298
In February of 2014, one month after the appeal was heard, the Lusaka
High Court issued a stay of execution on the Project’s development that has
since then stalled the Kangaluwi Project. 299 The decision was expected in April
of 2015, but it has been delayed. 300 In the meantime, the stay of execution
remains in place, and the outcome of the appeal has not yet been announced. 301
The proposed Kangaluwi Copper Project covers the copper deposits of
Kangaluwi, Chisawa, and Kalulu, and it is located 180 kilometers east of Lusaka,
Zambia. The entire Project area lies within the Lower Zambezi National Park. 302
The park surrounds 120 kilometers of the Zambezi River, and it is one of the
four most visited parks in Zambia. 303 It also has a significant diversity of wildlife
and communities. 304 According to official company reports, prospective drilling
in this area has led the company to believe that there are significant amounts of
copper to be retrieved from this roughly 245 square kilometer area. For this
reason, it sought a twenty-five year large scale mining license for this area in
March of 2011. 305 Although the company’s submitted environmental impact
assessment for the Project was rejected by the Zambian Environmental
Management Agency shortly after it received the mining license, Zambezi
Resources Ltd. appealed the rejection, and the Minister of Lands, Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection, overturned the rejection of the
Project’s environmental impact assessment and gave full permission for use of
the copper mine. 306 This decision is the one currently on appeal. 307 One of the
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reports that supports the appellants’ view is entitled “Kangaluwi Open-pit
Copper Mine in the Lower Zambezi National Park,” which was written in
November of 2014, after the court had heard the most recent appeal. 308 The
report criticizes Zambezi Resources Ltd.’s lack of transparency with respect to
information regarding the potential negative impacts of open-pit mining inside
important protected areas in Zambia, such as the Lower Zambezi National
Park. 309 More specifically, it argues that the company has failed to give a
thorough assessment of the potential social, environmental, and economic
impacts that the Kangaluwi Mine would have on the surrounding area within the
Lower Zambezi National Park, and there is still today a critical lack of
information to address any concerns about these potential impacts. 310
Some potential negative impacts considered by this report include longterm harm to the health of the Zambian people, wildlife, environment, and
tourism industry, and it also questions the Kangaluwi Copper Project’s ability to
undertake responsible mining practices in a protected area that is vital to
Zambia’s sustainable tourism industry. 311 The Park is bordered to the south by
the Zambezi River, and contamination of this river and its tributaries from
mining runoff is argued by the appellants to be a serious concern if the Project
were allowed to progress. 312 The Project site is near an important water
catchment for the entire Zambezi River system. 313 The human population
concentrated along this river system, whether in Zambia or across national
borders in Zimbabwe or Mozambique, has the potential to be negatively
affected through contaminated water consumption, contaminated fisheries, and
the contamination of trophic food chain levels. 314 The Project also has the
potential to negatively impact thousands of people who depend on artisanal
fishing, subsistence agriculture, and animal husbandry for their livelihoods. 315
Levels of soil contamination associated with open-pit copper mining are high,
and the report alleges that at this point Zambia has a lack of capacity to regulate
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and enforce health and safety standards for such a mining project. 316
Contaminants such as copper can persist in the environment for hundreds of
years and play a key role in long-term environmental pollution. 317 Open pit
mining also involves large-scale deforestation and road building, and this has the
potential to significantly impact the wildlife within the national park. 318
Thus in many respects, this case, like the Serengeti case in the EACJ and
the Gibe III Dam case in the Land and Environment Court in Kenya, is
premised on potential environmental harms. In all these cases a fragile
ecosystem was argued to be under threat arising from a mega-development
project. Thousands of residents who live in the vicinity of these development
programs advance claims that their livelihood, food, shelter, and a clean and safe
environment would be adversely affected. The suit was filed against the
Zambian government and a wholly-owned local subsidiary of a multinational
corporation in a national court where there was no jurisdictional contest. Unlike
in the Gibe III case from the Land and Environment Court in Kenya, there
were no claims of constitutional violations relating to the right to information—
possibly because the Constitution of Zambia, unlike the 2010 Constitution of
Kenya, does not guarantee such a right. 319 However, both cases raised the
absence of a credible environmental impact assessment.
Unlike the Serengeti decision, or the decision of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights with regard
to the Niger Delta, these national court decisions did not directly raise questions
of violations of sub-regional, regional, or international law. Thus a major
advantage of international courts is their ability to test the legality of megadevelopment projects against rules of international law generally and
international environmental law in particular. Finally, it is also quite clear that the
two national court decisions from Kenya and Zambia discussed above were, like
the Serengeti case, predicated on potential environmental harm. Plaintiffs, as we
have seen, have a harder time prevailing in such cases. By contrast, the cases
arising from the Niger Delta where environmental harm is very evident and
occurred in the past or is continuing, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights as well as the ECOWAS Court of Justice had no hesitation
issuing decisions against the government of Nigeria. A major hurdle that litigants
who bring these suits face in international courts is their inability to entertain
suits against corporate actors. However, national courts much more easily fill
316
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this gap as we have seen in both the Gibe III case from Kenya and the Zambian
mining case as well.
I want to end this section by noting that the South African judiciary has
also made significant steps in protecting the environment. Thus a former Chief
Justice of South Africa’s Constitutional Court noted from the bench that “courts
have a crucial role to play in the protection of the environment.” 320 The
foregoing survey demonstrates the expanding role of domestic courts in
implementing, applying and enforcing environmental laws in a manner that
mirrors the case law of Africa’s international courts. Together, national and
international courts have therefore played an important role in giving content to
environmental rights; facilitating administrative justice in environmental law;
promoting judicial access to enforcing environmental obligations; examining the
validity of governmental conduct in the area of the environment and making
links between rights of indigenous peoples to environmental rights.

VI. F EATURES OF I NTERNATIONAL E NVIRONMENTAL
J UDICIALISM AND I T S T HEORETICAL I MP LICATIONS
What are the features of judicial environmentalism arising from our
examination of the foregoing cases? A major feature of judicial
environmentalism is the manner in which Africa’s international courts have
embraced the principle of systemic integration, which is promoting coherence
within a fragmented system of international law rules. Thus, although these
international courts are established within sub-regional trade integration
schemes, they interpret and apply norms of international human rights and
environmental law both under Africa’s regional human rights system and under
multilateral environmental treaties. In effect these courts apply and interpret
rules of international law outside their immediate sub-regional treaty system.
Take the example of the East Africa Court of Justice’s First Instance Division
Serengeti decision on the merits, which stopped the government of Tanzania
from building a road through a UNESCO world heritage site. 321 The court
invoked a rule of systemic integration contained in Article 130(1) of the Treaty
for the Establishment of the East African Community, that serves an equivalent
role to that of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,
and concluded that East African Community treaties should not be interpreted
320
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in isolation of other treaties such as the African Convention on Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources, the Rio Declaration, the Stockholm Declaration,
and the U.N. Convention on Biodiversity. 322 As interpreted by the EACJ,
Article 130(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African
Community strongly suggests that EAC treaties should be interpreted in a
manner that furthers the objectives of these other treaties. 323 Similarly, Article
21(b) of the SADC Tribunal Protocol gives the Tribunal authority to “develop
its own community jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general
principles, and rules of public international law.” 324 This broad interpretive rule
has given the Tribunal leeway to draw from a variety of legal sources beyond
treaty law such as aspirational norms and legal scholarship. This contrasts
sharply with other international legal fora such as the WTO’s dispute settlement
in which non-WTO law cannot be interpreted to override WTO rules. 325

A. Theoretical Implications
The resort to international judicial environmental decision-making
indicates a new redeployment of an African international courts, and
demonstrates that the evolution of African international courts is unlikely to
replicate the European model on which they are based. Second, this turn
demonstrates that proposals to establish international environmental courts
underestimate the capability of newer courts to be redeployed from their original
mandates to new aims. African international courts have indeed been evolving
incrementally as a result of new rules in second generation regional trade
agreements that include goals such as human rights and environmental
protection. New players, like NGOs, have a vested interest in mobilizing these
rules and evolving contexts in which regional cooperation has slowly but surely
come to be accepted by States as putting constraints on their sovereignty. 326 The
emergence of judicial environmentalism in Africa’s international courts is
nevertheless surprising.
This is because it has long been assumed that there needs to be a more
structured, organized, and coordinated model of claiming environmental
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violations, particularly through international courts. 327 Others have argued that
the best way to promote transnational environmental values is to have an
international environmental court. 328 Yet others have argued that it would be
best to retrofit existing international courts to better protect the environment. 329
African international courts have evolved differently from the consensus in
the literature described above. Although African international courts were
established as trade courts to decide cases on regional trade integration, they
have been redeployed first to protect human rights and now to protect the
environment. The courts have turned to treaty language that protects the
environment in standalone provisions, rather than invoking human rights
provisions to find violations of environmental protections. 330
The EACJ has become a convenient forum to break down the strong
prevalence of positivism—the idea that courts construed rules so strictly that
they ignored their underlying policy rationales as expressed in their object and
purpose. The EACJ’s case law solidly rejects such an approach to judicial
decision-making. 331 In this respect, the EACJ is heralding a new era of judicial
review of violations not only of human rights, but also of environmental
provisions. You may ask, why have the judges of the EACJ tended to act so
differently when they sit on their national courts—that is we assume national
courts are overwhelmingly positivist—why have these judges behaved differently
when they are sitting on the regional court? A regional court that does not
require judges to disclose their votes insulates judges from the backlash that they
fear they might suffer at home if they made similar decisions. Further, we must
not assume that national courts have been uniformly hostile to deciding human
rights cases as the EACJ has. The point here is that the EACJ has been fairly
uniform in deciding human rights cases even when such decisions were clearly
seen to undermine the authority of member governments in a way that national
courts have not.
Africa’s international courts are recent creations. Although they imitate
older courts and in particular the European Court of Justice in form, their
human rights case law indicates that they embrace institutional flexibility in their
decision-making more than the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body would
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embrace. By defying the distinct compartmentalization of trade and human
rights courts, African International Trade Courts have broken the post-second
world war distinction of separate realms for economic and human rights judicial
institutions. Now they have further expanded their jurisdiction over
environmental cases. In so doing this they have, on occasion issued bold orders
such as the one stopping the construction of the Serengeti highway. Clearly,
there are limits to the amount of institutional flexibility that can be achieved.
Resources for significantly expanding the role of these courts are limited.
Yet, I think it important to note that the willingness of these courts to
embrace environmental cases—a willingness that is instructive for multilateral
tribunals such as the WTO’s dispute settlement body. In other words, there is no
reason why the WTO’s dispute settlement body could not borrow more from
the preambular aspirations of the Treaty Establishing the WTO, as well as
GATT 1994, which both refer to goals like the creation of full employment and
sustainable development. 332 The preambular provisions of the WTO’s TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) contains similar
aspirational language when it refers to not only the protection of intellectual
property rights, but also to the promotion of technological innovation and the
transfer of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge. 333 The TRIPS Agreement also refers the ability of
WTO members to adopt “measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development.” 334 This preambular
language could be mobilized with the same results we have seen, first for human
rights cases, and subsequently for environmental cases in Africa’s international
courts.
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In fact, newer generational regional trade agreements between the E.U. and
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries contain references to goals such as
human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and the protection of the
environment. 335 It seems to be widely accepted that these provisions are merely
hortatory or non-binding 336 and in my view these provisions point to the
adaptation to changing circumstances—for survival these institutions have to
keep in line with changing political, social, and economic conditions. What
African international courts have shown though, is that these provisions are not
vestiges of institutional survival or merely decorative tools to be left as lofty
aspirations without the prospect of their enforcement. African international
courts are showing that what many international lawyers have referred to as
fragmentation in international law, which refers to the existence of so many
separate legal regimes or systems that have nothing to do with each other, can be
addressed within existing institutional structures. In short, even though these
courts were established as international trade courts, they have become relevant
to the environmental and human rights concerns of African citizens as well.
They decided not to behave like the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body
which continues to narrowly confine its mandates to decide only cases that raise
trade issues exclusively under WTO rules. That Africa’s international courts have
not decided to confine their role to merely trade issues also shows that African
regional trade agreements are not merely confined to achieving market
liberalization. After all, these agreements have commitments in a broad variety
of areas. 337 The interpretive approach of African regional trade courts is
therefore consistent with these multiple objectives to the extent that this
approach does not give priority to one set of objectives (for example, trade) over
another (for example, human rights). In fact as the case law that I have discussed
in this Article shows, there is nothing to suggest that these courts cannot
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simultaneously decide trade cases while deciding environmental and human
rights cases. As these courts grow and as their legitimacy spreads and people get
to know how to use them, separate chambers could be established within them
to decide cases of different genres—a chamber to decide trade cases, a chamber
to decide human rights cases, and another to decide environmental cases, for
example. If separate chambers were established, I would hope that the flexibility
in deciding cases that straddle different issue areas, so that an environmental
division would not decide a human rights issue in an environmental case for
example, would not be lost in that process.
Ultimately, this Article has demonstrated the expanding role of Africa’s
international and domestic courts in implementing, applying and enforcing
environmental laws and policies. Together, national and international courts
have therefore played an important role in giving content to environmental
rights; facilitating administrative justice in environmental law; promoting judicial
access to enforcing environmental obligations; examining the validity of
governmental conduct in the area of the environment; and making links between
rights of indigenous peoples to environmental rights. These new roles assumed
by African international courts are a far cry from the excessive reliance on
common law concepts such as nuisance and negligence that existed prior to the
enactment of modern environmental statues at the national, regional and subregional levels in the last two decades. It is this expanded landscape of
environmental law along with broadened standing and active involvement of
civil society groups that has resulted in Africa’s new judicial environmentalism.

VII. C ONCLUSIONS
Corporate actors, particularly foreign investors in developing countries,
operate in the not so clear zone between international law and domestic law. 338
This Article has however shown that between international and national law is a
growing and vibrant regime of regional law complete with judicial institutions at
the pan-African level. While these courts are new and fledgling and susceptible
to political backlash, they are beginning to provide a new and important forum
for holding governments accountable for violations of regional environmental
law agreements. Of course, this accountability does not stretch far enough to
hold corporate actors accountable, but clearly the groundwork has been laid
down by these cases. In addition, there is a proposal to expand the jurisdiction
of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights that might help address this
gap. Under this proposal, there will be a new clause on corporate criminal
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liability added to a revised Charter of the African Court of Human and Peoples’
Rights that could potentially be used to hold corporate actors accountable for
environmental harms. 339
This Article has demonstrated how African international courts are
mobilizing international environmental law in unprecedented ways. As the
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights noted in 2001,
environmental rights “are essential elements of human rights in Africa.” 340 The
cases discussed in this Article exemplify a judicial environmentalism that is
unique to Africa—one shaped by treaty provisions that oblige African countries
to have regard for the environment and mobilized by non-state actors to hold
governments accountable, particularly for undertaking infrastructural activities or
endorsing extractive initiatives inconsistent with the protections embodied in
these provisions. If the cases discussed in this paper are anything to go by, there
are good prospects for international judicial environmentalism in Africa. The
fact that NGOs and individuals can bring cases in these courts and the courts
continue to remain receptive and responsive, the trend may continue. It would
also be reinforced by the availability of a related and parallel stream of cases in
national judiciaries as we have seen with the examples from Kenya and Zambia.
The fact that these cases are filed against states however leaves a huge
accountability gap to the extent private actors responsible for the same kind of
environmental damage are not amenable to suit in Africa’s fledgling international
courts. This accountability gap for private actors continues an unfortunate legacy
that has degraded the environment in many third world countries, including in
Africa. 341 In addition, while Africa’s new judicial environmentalism is welcome
particularly in adding the protection of the environment as a value alongside
economic development, it is important not to overestimate the ability of these
judicial interventions to guarantee the success of environmental goals
particularly when the development paradigms that are triggering the kind of
cases discussed in this Article remain embedded in programs of economic
development that are not designed to faithfully comply with the kind of
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